Russia’s behaviour on the battlefield demonstrates its unwillingness to search peaceful compromises. Instead, it wants to prosecute a strategy of prolonging the war to safe more territorial gains. This aligns with Putin’s erstwhile statements. In particular, he made it clear in October 2022 and June 2024 that his minimum nonsubjective was to full incorporate the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts. Also, back in December 2024, this point was reiterated by Andrei Belousov, the Russian defence minister, who emphasized that the Kremlin would only agree to a ceasefire and peace talks if Ukraine withdraws from these oblasts. Kyiv would besides be forced to drop its NATO membership aspirations.
Hence, it does not look like the Kremlin is planning to slow down any time soon. Its unrealistic preconditions prove that a possible peace settlement is improbable this year. Moscow is not even willing to put attacks on energy infrastructure on hold. In this regard, notwithstanding the Kremlin’s fresh agreement to halt attacks on energy infrastructure targets for a period in mid-March 2025, attacks have continued at a akin pace. The fresh shelling of Kherson’s energy infrastructure on April 1st, which cut power to over 45,000 residents, signifies Russia’s unwillingness to respect the terms of this agreement.
Fast territorial gains
Overall, the Kremlin excelled on the battlefield last year. In particular, between October and December, the Russian army advanced much faster than in 2023, capturing territories amounting to around 1,700 square kilometres. Most of this territory is located in Donetsk Oblast.
The pace of the offensive saw the Kremlin’s territorial gains highest in November before slowing down between January and March this year. Nevertheless, the Russian army captured more than 3 times as many territories this year as last year and shows no sign of slowing down. On the contrary, the Kremlin utilized the winter break to rearm and replenish its forces before proceeding with more active offensive measures.
Ramped-up military production to back up offensive actions
Russia has been focusing on building up its military production capacities, rearming its troops, and concentrating its offensive efforts to maximize territorial gains in the south and east of the country.
Most remarkably, the Kremlin allocated over 145 billion US dollars to national defence, accounting for 32.5 per cent of its overall budget expenditure for 2025. This step signifies the highest defence spending since russian times, underlining the Kremlin’s commitment to accomplish its set military objectives. This has already been reflected in increased production capacities concerning shells, rockets, tanks, and drones.
The Kremlin is allegedly increasing its rocket production this year. It aims to produce over 750 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles and over 560 KH-101 cruise missiles that could substantially enhance its ability to conduct more precise and high-impact strikes on critical military and civilian infrastructure. This would most likely besides translate in practice into more casualties among military personnel and civilians. Furthermore, back in November 2024, satellite imagery evidence surfaced indicating that the Kremlin has been substantially expanding 5 military production facilities for solid-fuel rocket engines. This points to Moscow’s plans to ramp up its rocket production substantially.
Also, the Kremlin is presently producing around 250,000 artillery shells all month, intending to safe a stockpile that is 3 times larger than that of the US and Europe combined.
Russia has besides been actively boosting its drone production capacities domestically and via global cooperation. This strategy besides received crucial backing from Putin. This approach was reflected in his late signed decree that lays out plans for the training of 1.5 million drone operators over the next 5 years. specified changes will happen within the framework of the “Strategy for the improvement of Unmanned Aviation through to 2035”. This approach demonstrates the Kremlin’s readiness to prioritize unmanned aerial systems. This is besides reflected in ramped-up drone production over the last respective years. In particular, around 140,000 drones were produced in 2023, increasing tenfold in 2024. The Kremlin aims to increase this production further, aiming to make between 3 and 4 million drones in 2025. Also, among fresh steps was the announced plan to build a drone manufacturing plant in Belarus with a production capacity of up to 100,000 drones annually.
All of the above-mentioned developments have already been reflected in Russian actions, with its forces methodically targeting Ukraine’s energy, logistics, and defence production sites with combined drone and rocket attacks. This has led to crucial casualties among civilians and increased infrastructure damage, including heating and power disruptions for a prolonged time.
Increased conscription rate
Since February 2022, the Kremlin has increased its troop deployment in Ukraine 5 times, averaging 8,000 to 9,000 fresh troops all month. From January to April 2025, the Russian army increased its forces from 603,000 to 623,000 people. This means that the force has grown on average by 5,000 fresh recruits each period since the start of the year.
Furthermore, in light of the possible fresh offensive this year, there is more information emerging about the ongoing large-scale attempts at conscription over spring. This is in line with Putin’s decree stipulating the drafting of 160,000 fresh conscripts into the Russian army, which is 30,000 more people compared to the autumn conscription drive last year.
New offensive and its implications for Ukraine
The Kremlin has continued to build up its offensive possible in the south and east of Ukraine. It has focused on capturing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, concentrating its peculiar efforts around specified strategically crucial localities as Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. In terms of Zaporizhzhia Oblast in the south of the country, the Russian army is pushing towards Stepove and Scherbaky to gain control over the Kamianske-Orikhiv Road. It could then subsequently decision in the direction of Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia.
Additionally, there are signs that the Russian army is working on stepping up offensive actions in Sumy and Kharkiv, 2 northeastern border oblasts, with the intent to establish a “buffer zone” in this area. In this regard, its army has nearly pushed Ukrainian troops out of its own Kursk Oblast and is already attempting to advance into neighbouring Sumy. In the case of the Kharkiv area, the Kremlin continues to launch ground attacks around the cities of Vovchansk and Kupiansk in order to push the Ukrainian army back towards Kharkiv and supposedly make a buffer zone.
For the remainder of the year, we can anticipate Russia’s continued push to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast before advancing to the south. This will besides search to make a buffer region in the country’s northeast. This overall offensive is aided by increasingly produced, precise, and high-impact missiles and drones, which will yet lead to more casualties among civilians and more severe critical infrastructure damage.
A call to action
Russia’s buildup of troops and ramped-up military production point to its plans to proceed with offensive efforts to accomplish more territorial gains, peculiarly in the south and east of Ukraine.
Western leaders should take a careful approach erstwhile it comes to knowing Russia’s objectives in Ukraine. They should act based not on what the Kremlin declares it will do but on how it acts in reality. Without doing so, they will proceed to erroneously presume that the Kremlin is leaning towards peace negotiations and slow down aid to Ukraine.
Currently, all the evidence points to the fact that the Russian leadership is not seriously considering any possible ceasefire or peace arrangement. Instead, it is focusing on capitalizing on its territorial gains in Ukraine despite its advanced casualty rate and equipment losses. Hence, there should be no easing of sanctions or another painful compromises to convince the Kremlin to negociate a peaceful resolution. It must be remembered that Moscow is inactive doing everything it can to avoid the negotiating table.
The Kremlin’s fresh actions send a clear message that Russia is preparing for more offensive efforts in Ukraine to capture more territories. Moscow does not want to negotiate. The tremendous increase in defence spending, coupled with rising troop numbers and ramped-up production of rockets, missiles, and another types of weaponry, indicate that the Kremlin is pursuing battlefield leverage. Putin does not want to sit down to discuss any possible settlement under the current circumstances as he has the advanced hand on the battlefield. Thus, western leaders request to measure Russian motives better and adjust their strategical approach accordingly, all while refusing to reward continued aggression against Ukraine.
Maksym Beznosiuk is simply a strategical policy expert and manager of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and global experts around key issues in the country. His work spans EU–Ukraine cooperation, energy and natural materials policy, governance in conflict-affected regions, and the security-policy nexus. He holds an LL.M. in Global Environment and Climate Change Law from the University of Edinburgh, a Double Master’s in European Studies (Euroculture) from Uppsala and Jagiellonian universities, and Bachelor and Specialist degrees in global Law and global Relations from Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University.
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